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Case Comments
International Law Cases in National Courts
RICHARD C. ALLISON*, Departmental Editor

Several cases involving sovereign immunity have recently come before
courts in the United States. In addition, other cases with international
ramifications have been decided.
Sovereign Immunity
The primacy of the United States Department of State in determining
whether or not to accord sovereign immunity in a particular case was
reaffirmed in Amkor Corporation v. Bank of Korea, 298 F.Supp. 143
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Defendant, the fiscal arm of the Korean Government and acting as its
agent, invited bids for the construction of a caustic soda plant to be built
for a private Korean corporation pursuant to a program of economic
cooperation between the Korean and United States Governments. Plaintiff
was the successful bidder for certain machinery and equipment, but subsequently the agreement was cancelled by the Director of the International
Cooperation Administration. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant
based on breach of contract and, alternatively, on breach of defendant's
warranty of authority when it entered into the agreement.
Defendant requested a suggestion of immunity from the Department of
State, but was refused, on the ground that, under the "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity, the essence of the transaction was commercial or
private as opposed to governmental or public. The note from the Department of State indicated that the restrictive policy focuses on the nature of
the activities in question rather than the character of the government
agency involved or upon its reasons for engaging in the activities.
*Member of the New York Bar. Assisted by Michael L. Owen of the New York and
California Bars and A. Ronald Wilkoc of the New York Bar.
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Defendant's motion to dismiss on the sole ground of sovereign immunity
was denied on the ground that the Department of State's determination
that immunity need not be extended was binding on the court. The court
quoted the decision in Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den. 381 U.S. 934 (1965), to the effect that it
is senseless to deny a litigant his day in court to avoid embarrassing the
State Department if that agency indicates, either directly or indirectly, that
it will not be embarrassed.
The court further noted that, in any event, under the facts of the case,
the activities giving rise to the dispute were private and commercial in
nature and, therefore, applying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, defendant was not entitled to immunity.
Sovereign Immunity
In its second consideration of the case,t the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the defense of
sovereign immunity put forth by The Republic of Vietnam to a motion to
compel arbitration in Pan American Tankers Corporation v. Republic of
Vietnam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Plaintiffs' motion arose out of an agreement for the transportation of
cement, which, plaintiffs alleged, was breached by defendants, the Ministry
of Economy of The Republic of Vietnam and two Vietnamese corporations. Plaintiffs served a notice of motion for an order to compel arbitration pursuant to the alleged contract, to which motion The Republic of
Vietnam appeared specially and entered its plea of sovereign immunity,
based on the contention that its role in the transactions involved was that
of governmental supervisor over the expenditure of foreign exchange, and
that, therefore, its acts were political or sovereign in nature.
The Court declined to accept the plea of sovereign immunity entered by
The Republic of Vietnam. In the first place, following the criteria set out in
Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de A bastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 934 (1965) for
cases in which the State Department has not made an affirmative suggestion of immunity, the court held that what The Republic of Vietnam was
accused of doing could not be characterized as public or sovereign acts. It
indicated that the critical inquiry concerned the basic character of the line
of conduct which generated the lawsuit, which, in this case, was the alleged
breach of a commercial contract to transport cement. The only action that
tThe first was in Pan American Tankers Corporation v. Republic of Vietnam, 291 F.
Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which involved the procedural point of how a plea of sovereign

immunity should be entered and adjudicated, and was reported in 3
LAWYER

THE INTERNATIONAL

700 (April 1969).
internationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2

Case Comments

401

The Republic of Vietnam would be required to defend was the making of a
contract containing an applicable arbitration provision. Such activity, the
court concluded, was commercial in nature and, therefore, sovereign immunity should not be accorded to The Republic of Vietnam.
Further, the court noted that, even assuming that the alleged currency
control activities claimed by The Republic of Vietnam were material to the
issue of sovereign immunity, The Republic of Vietnam failed to sustain its
burden of proving that its role was limited to political or sovereign acts.
The only proof put forth was an affidavit of the Ambassador of The
Republic of Vietnam to the United States merely denying that The Republic of Vietnam was a contracting party and asserting that it acted only to
control the expenditure of foreign exchange.
However, in conjunction with its claim of sovereign immunity, The
Republic of Vietnam had submitted various documents which obliquely
raised other questions as to whether, under the applicable law of Vietnam,
(a) the signature of the director of Commercial Aid signified only that the
Vietnamese Government had approved the proposed importation of cement and that said signature did not make the Government a party to the
agreement, and, (b) assuming that The Republic of Vietnam did enter into a
contract of some kind with plaintiffs, whatever it was did not incorporate
the arbitration clause upon which plaintiffs relied. The court indicated that
the references to such arguments were vague and ambiguous and, holding
in abeyance its decision ordering the parties to proceed to arbitration, it
granted The Republic of Vietnam leave to file papers stating in specific and
plain terms every ground of its objections to the arbitration proceedings
demanded by plaintiffs.
Sovereign Immunity -Puerto

Rico

In the case of Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc. v. Perez, 295 F.Supp. 187
(1968), the United States District Court of the District of Puerto Rico
affirmed the right of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to plead sovereign
immunity.
Plaintiffs, various steamship companies engaged in the transportation of
cargo between the ports of the United States and Puerto Rico, sought relief
in connection with demands made upon them by the defendant, Manager of
the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund. Plaintiffs had been notified that the
Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act required them to pay
for insurance to cover the seamen employed aboard their vessels as to the
risk of accidental injury while working in the territorial or navigable waters
of Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs first sought a declaratory judgment of their rights
against the defendant's collection of such insurance premiums.
This Court's first ruling dismissed plaintiffs' action on the ground that
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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"Congress intended to clothe the Government of Puerto Rico with power
to provide for the application of its workmen's compensation act, to injuries suffered by employees on local navigable waters." (295 F.Supp. at
189). This ruling was later overturned by the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which held that the Puerto Rico Workmen's
Accident Compensation Act could not preempt the general rule of maritime law which Congress had expressly made applicable to Puerto Rican
waters. The court held that it was not the intent of the Puerto Rican
legislature that this Workmen's Accident Compensation Act be used to
require an employer to purchase duplicate compensation insurance.
On plaintiffs' motion for judgment, the District Court enjoined the defendant from collecting the insurance premiums from plaintiffs and ordered
the reimbursement of moneys previously collected.
Defendant then raised the question of sovereign immunity claiming that,
since the State Insurance Fund pays over all premiums collected by it to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the second form of relief sought by
plaintiffs is, in effect, a suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In
this case the court upholds defendant's contention, finding that the real
party in interest is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, since it would be
the Commonwealth which would have to pay over the previously collected
premiums.
The question then before the Court is "whether or not Puerto Rico can
be sued without its consent in a Court of the United States." (295 F.Supp.
at 19 1). The answer to this question the Court determines is "closely tied
to the question of whether Puerto Rico is a sovereign or not, in a fashion
similar as the states of the United States are sovereigns." (295 F.Supp. at
193). The Court points to the case of People of Porto Rico v. Rosaly y
Castillo, 277 U.S. 270, 33 S.Ct. 352 (1913), which reversed the decision of
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and held that the Territory of Puerto
Rico had been organized in a manner very similar to the way in which the
Territory of Hawaii had been organized, and that the Territory of Puerto
Rico was similarly immune from suits to which no consent had been given.
The court then goes on to hold that the legislation permitting Puerto
Rico to become a Commonwealth in 1952, "did not abridge what sovereign
powers Puerto Rico had been granted [under previous United States legislation], but rather continued them and, if anything, amplified them." (295
F.Supp. at 197). The Court summarizes the legislation in arriving at the
status of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as follows:
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a body politic which has received,
through a compact with the Congress of the United States, full sovereignty
over its internal affairs in such a manner as to preclude a unilateral revocation,
on the part of Congress, of that recognition of powers.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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There can be no question that under the Foraker Act and the Jones Act, and
more so under the Federal Relations Act, the Government of Puerto Rico is
sovereign and has at least the same attributes as any other fully organized
Territory or State. (295 F.Supp. at 197).

The court then points out that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has
given its consent to be sued pursuant to the Act on Claims and Suits
Against the Commonwealth, Act. No. 104 of June 29, 1955, as amended,
which requires that actions on those specific causes of action set forth
therein be brought before the Court of First Instance of Puerto Rico,
rather than before the Federal Courts.
After dismissing certain grounds of defense, the court holds that it lacks
jurisdiction to order the refunds of premiums previously collected by the
defendant on the grounds that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as to
this request of relief, is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
sovereign immunity.
Sovereign Immunity -Salary

of United Nations Employee

In Means v. Means, 303 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1969), the
Family Court held that the salary and allowances paid to an employee of
the United Nations were exempt from an order of sequestration sought on
behalf of the employee's dependents.
The case arose when petitioner (the employee's wife, or ex-wife depending on the effects of a Turkish divorce obtained without personal jurisdiction over petitioner) brought a proceeding seeking the sequestration order
as an indication that she and her child were entitled to more than the
amount being remitted to her by the United Nations pursuant to the
purported Turkish decree of divorce. Such an order would be a tangible
basis for petitioner to request the support of the Department of State of the
United States to persuade the U.N. to consent to remit to the court a
greater amount than it was remitting to petitioner.
Judge Midonick held that, since respondent neither was served personally nor appeared at a statutory hearing, the order for support should be
temporary and the sums, if any, impounded to give respondent an opportunity to appear. However, expressly excluded "for the time being" from
any sequestration order were all sums payable or to become payable from
the United Nations Secretariat to respondent as an employee thereof. The
exclusion was based on the sovereign immunity of the United Nations and
could not be interfered with unless and to the extent that the United
Nations consented to placing such sums at the disposal of the orders of the
court.
Sovereign Immunity -Consular Property
The Court of Appeals of New York recently answered affirmatively the
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2

404

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

question of whether, as a matter of customary international law, consular
premises are exempt from municipal real property taxes. Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 25 N.Y.2d 252, 250 N.E.2d 698 (Ct. App.
N.Y. July 1, 1969).
The Republic of Argentina, owner of property in New York City which
it uses as its consulate, instituted the action against the City of New York
seeking, in one count, the return of the real property taxes it paid on that
property between 1947 and 1965 and, in the second count, a judgment
declaring those premises tax exempt and discharging the tax liens imposed
against the property for unpaid taxes assessed since 1966. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court found for the City
and was affirmed on appeal.
In answer to plaintiffs claim of immunity, the City contended that there
is no established international rule preventing local taxation of consular
offices. The United States Government, appearing as amicus curiae, argued
in support of Argentina that, under recognized principles of international
law, state and municipal taxes should not be assessed against foreign
government-owned property used for public noncommercial purposes. The
Court, in reversing the appeal court decision, agreed that immunity should
be accorded, not "solely upon what the government urges are to its best
interests," but on the basis of customary international law.
The main source of such law looked to by the Court was the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, which, though not yet ratified
by the Senate, constituted "weighty authority" as a consensus of international lawyers as to what "principles" were "generally accepted" in
international law. The Vienna Convention, observed the Court, provided
that consular premises should be "exempt from all national, regional or
municipal dues and taxes whatsoever, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered." (Art. 32, Sec. 1)
The Court pointed to several reasons why "so many nations refrain from
imposing real estate taxes on foreign consulates." For one, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the collection of any tax levied
against a friendly foreign government if that government did not wish to
pay it, since no sovereign state can itself be sued, nor have its property
attached or levied upon without its consent. In view of this, the Court
continued, including among its assets a tax levy which it could not collect
would be misleading for the city. The City argued that its tax claims
constituted a lien on the premises in case the foreign government disposed
of the property to an entity which had no immunity. However, the Court
disagreed on the ground that:

International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2

Case Comments

405

• .. since a lien has an immediate adverse effect upon the amount which the

government would receive on a sale, to sanction its imposition would constitute
a direct interference with the property of a foreign state and, as such, would
violate the principle of sovereign immunity.
Finally, the Court rejected defendant's attempt to distinguish between
"diplomatic" and "consular" property for reasons of taxation, stating that:

In short, then, the test of immunity is not whether the property is used for a
'diplomatic' purpose, but, rather, whether it is used for a 'public' or 'governmental' purpose and, accordingly, it follows that consular property owned and
maintained by a foreign government is exempt from local real estate taxation,
just as is its ambassadorial property, under principles of customary international law.
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Republic of Argentina should
be granted summary judgment on its second count declaring the consular
property exempt from city taxes. However, since plaintiff had not previously presented to the city comptroller a demand for the refund of sums
paid for past taxes in accordance with the city's Administrative Code, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's first cause of action.
Clean Bills Of Lading - Transoceanic Shipping
In Greene, Steel & Wire Co. v. F. W. Hartmann & Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d
654 (App. Div. 1969), plaintiff purchased an amount of wire coils from
seller in Germany, which arranged shipment with a transoceanic shipping
company. The wire was received by the shipper's agents at several ports in
Germany, loaded aboard a vessel under charter to the shipper and delivered to the shipper's agent in the Port of New York, where it was unloaded
and stored on piers in Brooklyn. The coils when unloaded were rusted and
plaintiff brought an action claiming damages for alleged breach of contract
and negligence against the shipper and its agent in New York, and another
cause of action against the owner and operator of the piers for negligence
in failing to protect the coils after unloading, thereby causing further
damage.
The court affirmed a finding against the shipper on the ground that its
acceptance of the cargo on clean bills of lading created a presumption in
plaintiff's favor that the wire accepted for shipment was free of apparent
defects. Since the record supported a finding that the coils when unloaded
in Brooklyn were rusted beyond any superficial oxidation for which responsibility was excluded in the bills of lading, plaintiff was entitled to
recover its damage from the shipping company. The court further held that
interest would run from the date of completion of salvage operations rather
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than from the date on which the wire was unloaded at the pier, since
damages were unliquidated and unascertainable until that time.
However, the court reversed judgments against the agent in the Port of
New York and against the owner of the pier. The agent was not a party to
the shipping contract and was therefore not liable for damages before
delivery to Brooklyn. Since plaintiff had supplied no proof of further
damage after delivery, or of the agent's knowledge of the condition in the
bills of lading requiring unloading under a covered pier, or of the agent's
actual direction of the unloading, insufficient evidence had been produced
of the agent's negligence. Plaintiffs claim was also held to have failed
against the owner of the pier since plaintiff did not allege or prove its own
freedom from contributory negligence and established neither the extent of
damage on arrival nor the extent to which such damage was aggravated by
the alleged successive negligence of the owner of the pier.
Jurisdiction- Doing Business
In a recent case before the Supreme Court in Westchester County, New
York, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a suit brought on
grounds of negligence and breach of warranty by a New York resident
against the parent Volkswagen company ("VWAG") in Germany. In the
case of Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, Germany, N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1969, at 19, col. 8 (Sup. Ct.) the plaintiff, a resident of New York,
brought an action on grounds of negligence and breach of warranty for
personal injuries and property damage suffered in an accident in West
Germany. Plaintiff, while a member of the United States Armed Forces
stationed in West Germany, had purchased a new Volkswagen there,
which was subsequently recalled by VWAG because of defective parts and
workmanship. Soon after the automobile was repaired by a Volkswagen
dealer in West Germany, plaintiff claimed that the front wheel suspension
collapsed causing him to lose control of the car and resulted in serious
injuries to himself and total loss of the car.
The principal contention of the defendant, and the grounds on which the
suit is finally dismissed, is that, pursuant to CPLR 321 l(a)(8), the court
lacks jurisdiction because the defendant does not do business in New
York. In support of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, VWAG
contended that all of its manufacturing and selling of automobiles and parts
is done in Germany. It transacts no business in New York, nor has it
appointed any agent for service of process in New York. It has no property, employees, or telephone listings in New York. All its products sold in
the United States are sold to a wholly-owned subsidiary, which is a completely separate enterprise located in New Jersey. Title to defendant's
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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products sold to the subsidiary passes in Germany. The wholly-owned
subsidiary then sells the cars and parts to a completely independent New
York entity for distribution in New York.
The Court points out that its jurisdiction in this case would have to be
based on either Sections 301 or 302 of the New York CPLR. The bases of
jurisdiction encompassed by these two provisions are summarized by Justice Sirignano as follows:
"So in order to acquire and exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation there must be a showing that the corporation is doing business
within the state; or that the cause of action arose out of a transaction of
business or the commission of a tortious act within the state; or that a tortious
act committed by it outside of the state causes injury within the state; or owns,
uses or possesses any real property situated within the state."
On the issue of doing business in New York, the defendant claimed that
none of its operations would subject it to the court's jurisdiction; the
traditional touchstones of doing business such as the maintenance of bank
accounts, the owning or leasing of property, the employment of personnel
or a telephone listing are not present in this case. Plaintiff argued that
defendant was doing business in New York, however, on grounds that
New York is a vast market for the purchase of defendant's automobiles
resulting in a financial benefit to VWAG, and that Volkswagens are heavily
advertised in New York. The court pointed out that the injury resulting
from the alleged negligent act did not occur in New York. Furthermore,
the court found that the defendant's wholly-owned subsidiary in New
Jersey is not the agent of defendant, pointing to language in the import
agreement with the subsidiary to the effect that the subsidiary will act on
its own behalf and for its own account, with no authority whatsoever to act
as agent for or on account of the parent.
The court concludes, therefore, that under the facts of this case the
proper forum for this suit is Germany since the accident and injury occurred in Germany and since defendant is not doing business in New York
within the meaning of CPLR 301 or 302. The court also holds that
defendant did not submit itself to the court's jurisdiction by seeking to
vacate subpoenas or to quash subpoenas brought against an advertising
agency and a distribution agency in New York. Defendant has the right to
move to quash or modify these subpoenas since it is affected by them, and
such motions do not go to the merits of the action.
Civil Rights- Aliens
In the California case of People v. Navarro, 76 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Ct. App.
1969) the court upheld a 1925 decision to the effect that inability to speak
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 2
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English was alone an insufficient basis to infer alienage of a person accused
of the crime of possession of gun by a non-citizen.
The defendant had been arrested with a .44 caliber Magnum revolver in
his possession and charged with violation of California's Dangerous Weapons Control Law, Penal Code section 12021. Upon arrest the only evidence that the defendant was an alien was his inability to speak English.
After receiving the proper Miranda warnings in Spanish, defendant admitted he was from Mexico and not legally present in the United States.
The State did not contend, however, that this admission could be used in a
preliminary hearing to establish probable cause where no independent
evidence of alienage existed.
This court upheld the lower courts ruling that defendant's inability to
speak English was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the necessary
inference of alienage.
The court suggests that it might have reached the opposite result if this
had been a case of first impression, but it did not find "the compelling
reason or change in underlying law" necessary to justify its rejection of the
California Supreme Court holding in People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404, 238
p. 363 (1925).
Enforcement of Alimony and Support Agreements
In the recent case of Blitz v. Vietorisz, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1969, at 2, col.
I (App. T.) plaintiff brought an action seeking back payments of alimony
and support pursuant to a court-approved agreement which the two parties
had entered into while residents of Chile. This agreement had subsequently
been incorporated into a Mexican divorce decree.
The court, citing Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155 [1954], held that the law
of Chile had the most significant contracts with the matter in dispute and,
therefore, governed the interpretation of the agreement. Under Chilean
law, this agreement was shown to be valid and enforceable.
Defendant argued that plaintiff could not recover back alimony and
support payments since she had denied defendant his visitation rights
under the agreement.
This defense was rejected by the court on two grounds. The court first
holds, citing New York authority, that when the agreement does not make
the payments conditional on rights of visitation, the only proper course of
action is a motion to amend the decree to so provide. Secondly, the plaintiff
had not, as a matter of fact, deprived defendant of his rights of visitation.
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